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THE FALLOUT OF  
TOO BIG FOR TRIAL1: 




“Do you think they know that you think something is a piece of crap 
when you sell it to them and then bet against it, do you think they know 
that?”2 
The Subprime Mortgage Crisis of 2008 (Subprime Crisis or Crisis) 
caused an unprecedented worldwide recession.3  Between 2007 and 
  1 Wall Street Reform: Oversight of Financial Stability and Consumer and Investor 
Protections: Hearing Before the U.S. Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 
S.Hrg. 113-3 (Feb. 14, 2013), www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-113shrg80387/pdf/CHRG-
113shrg80387.pdf (phrase coined by Elizabeth Warren, Senator of Massachusetts, stated to Elisse 
Walter, chair of the Securities and Exchange Commission). 
                 Editor-in-Chief, Golden Gate University Law Review, J.D., 2014, Golden Gate 
University School of Law; B.A., English Literature, University of California Los Angeles, 2001.  I 
am indebted to Mike DiGrande and Ilon Oliveira for their invaluable edits and patience in the 
publication of this Comment, and to the entire Law Review Editorial Board for their humility and 
passion throughout the year.  I am eternally grateful to my family, friends, and mentors for sharing 
their adventurous and dynamic thought processes with me, and to all those figures, public and 
private, who have preceded us in this world; without a past to reflect upon, we would have no future 
to grasp for. 
 2 Wall Street and the Financial Crisis: The Role of Investment Banks: Hearing Before the 
U.S. Senate Permanent 
Subcommittee on Investigations, S.Hrg. 111-674 (Apr. 27, 2010) [hereinafter Hearing] (question of 
Carl Levin, Senator of Michigan, posed to Lloyd Blankfein, Chief Executive Officer of Goldman 
Sachs). 
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2010, the global financial services sector lost 325,000 jobs.4  In the 
United States, consumer household net worth decreased by $11 trillion.5  
Meanwhile, C-level executives (hereafter, executives or corporate 
officers)6 from sixteen of the firms most closely associated with the 
Subprime Crisis were eligible to receive golden parachute payments 
approaching $1 billion if their firms’ failures had resulted in their 
terminations.7  Because of the government bailout program,8 that money 
would have been indirectly funded by United States taxpayers. 
The Subprime Crisis presented the U.S. government with an 
opportunity to establish new responses to financial crises through 
reassessments of control person liability.  To avoid repeating the types of 
failure that precipitated the Subprime Crisis and caused the worst 
national recession since the Great Depression,9 legislators attempting to 
stabilize a financial system that has become characterized by products of 
unfathomable complexity10 should take novel steps, in addition to 
implementing regulations, to achieve their goals. 
While this Comment later outlines at least one viable model for 
legislators to follow, this introduction first sets the stage by discussing 
inadequate past responses to crises, the general nature of the failures of 
corporate leadership, and the inefficacy of the current corporate liability 
model in deterring the kinds of failures that brought down the economy 
in 2008.  Two cases will be introduced to provide context and, from 
there, the discussion will proceed. 
Government responses to the Subprime Crisis followed familiar 
patterns, predictably similar to responses to past crises.  The pattern is as 
follows: legislative committees hold hearings in which enraged public 
 3 See Jean Imbs, The First Global Recession in Decades, HEC LAUSANNE SWISS FINANCE 
INSTITUTE CEPR PRELIMINARY (October 12, 2009), 
http://sta.uwi.edu/conferences/09/salises/documents/J%20Imbs.pdf. 
 4 Charles Roame, Prior CEO Summits 2008-2009, TIBURON STRATEGIC ADVISORS, 
www.tiburonadvisors.com/Prior-CEO-Summits-2008-2009.html (last visited Mar. 6, 2013). 
 5 Id. 
 6 This article uses the term “C-level executives” to define the highest level managers within 
corporate structures, generally including, but not limited to, chief executive officer, chief financial 
officer, chief marketing officer, and general counsel.  See, e.g., Boris Groysberg et al., The New Path 
to the C-Suite, HARVARD BUSINESS REVIEW, March 2011, http://hbr.org/2011/03/the-new-path-to-
the-c-suite/ar/1. 
 7 See Subprime Golden Parachutes Could Cost Shareholders More Than $1 Billion, 
MARKET WIRE (Nov. 15, 2007, 1:33 PM), www.marketwire.com/press-release/subprime-golden-
parachutes-could-cost-shareholders-more-than-1-billion-793604.html. 
 8 Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Pub.L. No. 110–343, 122 Stat. 3765 
(Westlaw 2014). 
 9 See Imbs, supra note 3. 
 10 See infra notes 196-197. 
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officials question regulators11 and business leaders.12  New legislation to 
protect consumers is proposed and strict regulations are imposed to 
encourage stability and restore consumer confidence in the markets;13 
then, because increased regulation leads to higher product costs for 
consumers and, surprisingly, decreased transparency to regulators, the 
legislature passes laws that relax regulatory authority.  The judiciary then 
tries to work with regulations weakened by vague statutes. 
Attempts to increase transparency have historically translated into 
higher costs for consumers,14 while also providing incentives for 
managers to obscure information that might be deemed negative.15  
Because regulations have been reactive in nature, and because regulators 
rarely possess the expertise necessary to constrain innovators of industry 
(nor would they want to discourage innovation), the application of 
prudential regulations in isolation to provide industry-wide stability 
following a financial crisis has repeatedly proven futile.16  Thus, 
legislators must think outside the box, not only to monitor behavior and 
appropriately punish those who violate laws, but actually to prevent 
violations through a policy of deterrence.17 
Legislators must draw well-defined distinctions between cognitive 
and moral failures before attempting to delineate any deterrent policy.18  
The essence of cognitive failure is that if an executive at Company X 
does not fully understand the complexity of Product X, and neither does 
Consumer X, then when that product proves to be worthless, there is no 
 11 See, e.g., SEC Regulators on Defense at SEC Hearing, NBC NEWS (Jan. 27, 2009, 7:19 
PM), www.nbcnews.com/id/28872450/. 
 12 Hearing, supra note 2. 
 13 See Ronald Borod, Belling the Cat: Taming the Securitization Beast Without Killing It, 31 
REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 643, 643-645 (2012) (enumerating eleven specific factors mentioned by 
various commentators as contributing to the financial meltdown of 2008). 
 14 See infra note 243. 
 15 Id. 
 16 See, e.g., Michael Perelman, The Futility of Financial Regulation: Lessons from Science 
and Professional Football, UNSETTLING ECONOMICS BLOG (Sep. 13, 2009), 
http://michaelperelman.wordpress.com. 
 17 See Michael A. DiMedio, Comment, A Deterrence Theory Analysis of Corporate RICO 
Liability for “Fraud in the Sale of Securities”, 1 GEO. MASON L. REV. 135 (1994), for a discussion 
of deterrence theory in relation to RICO liability in the context of securities litigation; see also 
Robert W. Gordon, A New Role for Lawyers?: The Corporate Counselor After Enron, 35 CONN. L. 
REV. 1185, 1193-94 (2003) (“It is this layering of authority, fragmentation of responsibility, and 
decentralization that has made it possible for the chairman, CEO and board of directors of Enron, as 
well as the lawyers, to claim that they did not know much about what was going on in their own 
company.”). 
 18 See Arnold Kling, The Financial Crisis: Moral Failure or Cognitive Failure?, 33 HARV. 
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 507 (2010). 
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accountability attendant to Executive X.19  Caveat emptor.  The 
consumer is left footing the bill. 
The characterization of a failure, as either cognitive on the one 
hand, or moral on the other, should determine legislative strategy, 
because the complexity of the response must be dictated by the 
complexity of the failure.  If those who hold all the chips do not know 
any better, then perhaps their failures are of less serious scope than if 
they fully understand the implications of their actions.  If, however, they 
understand that the complex financial products they sell to investors have 
the potential to cause widespread economic devastation,20 then perhaps 
their actions should invoke liability more easily, and perhaps the 
government would be justified in allowing novel remedies for suffering 
investors.21 
In the case of the Subprime Crisis, pointing to the complexity of 
mortgage-backed securities (MBS) has been the get-out-of-jail-free-card 
for executives who might otherwise be held accountable.22  Because of 
heightened pleading standards,23 the executives most responsible for the 
failures associated with MBS could simply declare that incredible 
complexities associated with their products created voids of 
accountability, voids that compliance departments either could not or 
would not address.24  Executives could affirmatively claim good faith, 
because under current law, for fraud to have occurred, they would have 
had to misrepresent the facts or act with scienter.25  Claiming the 
complexity of products has allowed executives to deny misrepresentation 
of facts, for if the products were too complex to understand, then 
certainly misrepresentation was impossible to prove; similarly, if 
corporate structures were too complex for plaintiffs to understand, then 
 19 See id.at 508 (“[M]arket mistakes went unchecked not because regulators lacked the will 
or the institutional structure with which to regulate, but because they shared with the financial 
executives the same illusions and false assumptions.”). 
 20 Robert D. Piliero, The Credit Rating Agencies: Power, Responsibility and Accountability, 
THOMSON REUTERS NEWS & INSIGHT (Jul. 19, 2012), 
http://newsandinsight.thomsonreuters.com/Legal/Insight/ViewInsight.aspx?id=52525&LangType=1
033 (“The financial impact on investors . . . has been devastating.”). 
 21 See discussion infra Part II.D.I-II. 
 22 Piliero, supra note 20. 
 23 See discussion infra Part II.B.I. 
 24 See, e.g., Ben Protess & Azam Ahmed, MF Global’s Risk Officer Said to Lack Authority, 
N.Y. TIMES DEAL BOOK (Dec. 14, 2011, 9:53 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/12/14/mf-
globals-risk-officer-said-to-lack-authority/ (“MF Global . . .stripped critical powers from its top 
executive in charge of controlling risk, according to a person briefed on the matter.”). 
 25 See discussion infra Part II.B.I-II. 
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the prospect of simply pleading control person liability proved too 
difficult. 
But what about the failure inherent in representing a position on 
complex products without fully understanding the consequences; would 
such a failure be cognitive only, or also moral?26  The answer to this 
question is important, for the law has historically treated various actors 
differently depending on their moral turpitude.27 
If there is a legal distinction to be drawn between cognitive and 
moral failures as they relate to crises in the financial sector, that 
distinction ought to apply only to low-level employees of the companies 
that cause economic loss.  The Supreme Court in Hertz Corp. v. Friend 
elevated the legal status of corporate headquarters, specifically 
discussing the heightened command and control elements inherent in 
such places.28  By defining command and control as corporate leadership 
“direct[ing], control[ling], and coordinat[ing] the corporation’s 
activities” from, specifically, corporate headquarters, Justice Breyer’s 
opinion implied that it is precisely because corporate officers work at 
corporate headquarters that such locations are properly described as the 
principal places of business.29  Thus, by extension of reason from Hertz, 
there ought to be a distinct liability standard for corporate officers, one 
that recognizes their heightened levels of command and control.30  There 
is no justice in characterizing the Subprime Crisis as pure cognitive 
failure; accountability lies with everybody upstream of the sale of toxic 
products, resting most squarely upon executives at the toxic product 
 26 Kling, supra note 18, at 508-509 (describing moral failure by analogy to a fire started by 
delinquent teenagers whose parents were disinclined to supervise, and cognitive failure by analogy 
to authorities providing the lighter fluid, matches, and newspapers to start the fire, yet unaware of 
the inherent dangers in doing so). 
 27 Discharge, Exceptions to Discharge, and Objections to Discharge, NATIONAL 
BANKRUPTCY REVIEW COMMISSION 179, 179 (1997), 
http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/nbrc/report/07consum.pdf (“Many nondischargeable debts involve 
“moral turpitude” or intentional wrongdoing . . . .  Society’s interest in excepting those debts from 
discharge outweighs the debtor’s need for a fresh economic start.”). 
 28 See Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77, 92-93 (2010) (interpreting the statutory phrase, 
“principal place of business”). 
 29 Id. (“We conclude that ‘principal place of business’ is best read as referring to the place 
where a corporation’s officers direct, control, and coordinate the corporation’s activities. It is the 
place that Courts of Appeals have called the corporation’s ‘nerve center.’  And in practice it should 
normally be the place where the corporation maintains its headquarters—provided that the 
headquarters is the actual center of direction, control, and coordination, i.e., the ‘nerve center,’ and 
not simply an office where the corporation holds its board meetings (for example, attended by 
directors and officers who have traveled there for the occasion).”). 
 30 For the purposes of this article, the term “command and control” is analogous to the 
actions of corporate officers as they “direct, control, and coordinate” the corporation’s activities, as 
described in Hertz. 
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companies who knew or should have known that they were selling pieces 
of crap.31  It is these executives who reaped the most compensation32 and 
these executives who should have comprehended the risks involved with 
availing the markets of whatever products their companies sold.33  It is 
under the direction of these executives that corporate cultures were 
formed,34 with these executives that shareholders, employees, and 
investors placed their trust, and, this article argues, with these executives 
that courts should assign ultimate liability through control-person 
doctrine.35  The failure to understand a product by an executive who then 
directly or indirectly promotes that product is, of course, a cognitive 
failure;36 but worse, the failure by a society to clearly define a standard 
of care owed to the investing marketplace as a whole, not just to 
shareholders and employees, is a moral failure.37  Moral failures from 
corporate boardrooms to ratings agencies to regulatory bodies enabled 
the Subprime Crisis;38 in order to right past wrongs and prevent future 
evils, it is essential that the lawmakers of this country remember the 
Utilitarian principles espoused by Bentham to the Founders, and act 
accordingly.39 
The doctrine of corporate liability presents an unsustainable legal 
paradox.40  While the corporation is now symbolic of American 
capitalism, the corporate structure has not always been in favor;41 so, 
 31 Hearing, supra note 2. 
 32 See discussion infra Part II.C. 
 33 See infra notes 196-197. 
 34 See discussion infra Part I.A. 
 35 See Janus Capital Group, Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 131 S. Ct. 2296, 2311 (2011) 
(Breyer, J., dissenting) (“There is a dearth of authority construing Section 20(b), which has been 
thought largely superfluous in 10b–5 cases.”) (internal citation omitted). 
 36 Kling, supra note 18, at 508. 
 37 See JEREMY BENTHAM, A FRAGMENT ON GOVERNMENT (1776), 
www.constitution.org/jb/frag_gov.htm (“[I]t is the greatest happiness of the greatest number that is 
the measure of right and wrong.”). 
 38 See Kling, supra note 18, at 508. 
 39 Bentham, supra note 37. 
 40 Kathleen F. Brickey, Rethinking Corporate Liability Under the Model Penal Code, 19 
RUTGERS L.J. 593 (1988) (“Corporate criminal liability is a paradox [that] suggest[s] art imitating 
life [or] life miming art False Through this anthropomorphic sleight of hand, the common law subtly 
transformed the inanimate ‘corporation’ into a ‘person’ capable of committing criminal delicts and 
harboring criminal intent.”). 
 41 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to George Logan (Nov. 12, 1816), in 12 THE WORKS OF 
THOMAS JEFFERSON 310 (Paul Leicester Ford ed., 1905), available at 
http://oll.libertyfund.org/title/808 (follow “EBook PDF” hyperlink; then search “corporation”) (“I 
hope we shall take warning from the example and crush in it’s [sic] birth the aristocracy of our 
monied corporations which dare already to challenge our government to a trial of strength, and to bid 
defiance to the laws of their country.”). 
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while the continuing presence of corporations is likely to go 
unchallenged, there is current debate over how corporations should be 
held liable, with Senator Elizabeth Warren interpreting Attorney General 
Eric Holder’s testimony to Congress as an admission that “the biggest 
banks are too-big-to-jail.”42  The victim of corporate misdeeds is the 
broader corpus of the U.S. economy, and the main perpetrator is the 
pervasive corporate culture that continues to allow big banks to plead 
cognitive failures.  If justice is the ultimate goal of a civilized society,43 
then, within that society, the existing doctrine of corporate liability 
creates the unsustainable paradox of protecting individual executives 
who may act with impunity because, when harm is inflicted, they are 
able to hide behind the corporate veil. 
The corporate structure has promoted economic growth precisely 
because it provides limited liability to individual corporate employees.  
Risk-taking has been favored as a result, and should continue to curry 
favor, so long as accountability correlates with decision-making.  While 
most corporations are still small-scale, family-run operations, a relatively 
small number of inordinately powerful corporations have grown so 
large44 that many of the original justifications for the inception of 
corporations no longer apply to them.  “The classical model of 
corporations no longer accurately reflects the realities of corporate 
governance for large, publicly traded corporations.”45  Under the 
classical model, shareholders are owners who elect board members who 
in turn hire officers to manage the corporation.46  However, when a 
corporation goes public, the power of the original owners (shareholders) 
to control the fate of the corporation is diluted as the capital of general 
investors is exchanged for stock, resulting in the separation of control 
from original ownership.47  “The realist model of corporate structure . . . 
[holds] that companies are management controlled because shareholder 
dispersion ha[s] reached extremes which permitted decisions to be taken 
by management in disregard of shareholders’ interests.”48  Under the 
 
 42 Andrew Ross Sorkin, Realities Behind Prosecuting Big Banks, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 12, 2013, 
at B1. 
 43 THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 289 (Alexander Hamilton) (E. H. Scott ed., 1898) (“Justice is 
the end of government. It is the end of civil society.”). 
 44 See William Arthur Wines & Thomas M. Fuhrmann, An Inquiry into CEO Compensation 
Practices in the United States and Proposals for Federal Law Reform, 43 NEW ENG. L. REV. 221, 
235 (2009) (stating that Mobil-Exxon, if it was a country, has revenues, if they were GDP, that 
would make it the twentieth wealthiest country on earth). 
 45 Id. at 233. 
 46 Id. 
 47 Id. at 234. 
 48 Id. at 235. 
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realist model, there is a bi-linear relationship that gives controlling 
powers to the CEO and top management, and leaves shareholders with 
little or no actual power in corporate decision-making.49  Unsurprisingly, 
executive compensation has skyrocketed,50 but liability ultimately 
remains with shareholders. 
If justice is the goal of a civil society, then any system that protects 
individuals from deserved liability is flawed.  Take the following two 
cases, for example.  These lawsuits, filed against two high-profile 
corporations, provide a glimpse of the means by which the government 
has responded to the Subprime Crisis, but the results of these actions 
raise troubling questions about the failures of corporate leadership and 
control person liability. 
In a 2009 criminal action, the United States filed eleven counts of 
fraud against defendant Bernard L. Madoff.51  Presumably because 
Madoff had already openly admitted to running a Ponzi scheme, he pled 
guilty and was sentenced to 150 years in prison.52  In a related civil 
complaint against Madoff and Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities 
(BMIS),53 the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) filed claims 
for relief including fraudulent interstate transfers54 under the Securities 
Act of 1933 (Securities Act)55 and employment of manipulative 
deceptive devices56 under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 
(Exchange Act).57 
In a 2010 civil action against Goldman Sachs & Co. (Goldman 
Sachs or Goldman)58 and a Goldman employee, Fabrice Tourre, the SEC 
claimed similar violations under the Securities Act and the Exchange 
 49 Id. 
 50 See discussion infra Part II.A. 
 51 U.S. v. Madoff, No. 08 Mag. 2735 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 11, 2008). 
 52 Diana Henriques, Madoff Sentenced to 150 Years in Prison, N.Y. TIMES, June 29, 2009. 
 53 SEC v. Bernard L. Madoff and Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities LLC, No.08 Civ. 
10791 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 15, 2008). 
 54 15 U.S.C. §§ 77q(a)(1), (2), & (3) (Westlaw 2014). 
 55 Securities Act of 1933, 48 Stat. 74 (1933) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77a) (Westlaw 2014). 
 56 15 U.S.C. §78j(b), section 10(b), &17 C.F.R. §240.10b-5 promulgated thereunder [Rule 
10b5]. 
 57 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 881 (1934) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78a) 
(Westlaw 2014). 
 58 Goldman Sachs is the most profitable securities firm in Wall Street history.  Patricia 
Hurtado & Christine Harper, Tourre Says He Relied on Goldman, Denies SEC Fraud Claims, 
BLOOMBERG (Jul. 19, 2010), www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-07-20/tourre-says-he-relied-on-
goldman-sachs-compliance-denies-sec-fraud-claims.html. 
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Act.59  In response, but without admitting or denying the allegations, 
Goldman Sachs paid a record $550 million to settle the SEC charges.60  
Goldman returned $250 million to harmed investors through a Fair Fund 
distribution and paid $300 million in fines to the United States 
Treasury.61  The settlement also required Goldman to implement 
remediation of its review and approval processes of certain mortgage 
securities, including fortifying the role and responsibilities of internal 
legal counsel, compliance personnel, and outside counsel in the review of 
written marketing materials.62  Furthermore, the settlement required 
Goldman to strengthen its education and training programs, and 
Goldman acknowledged that it was conducting a comprehensive, firm-
wide review of its business standards.63  In many ways, part of the 
settlement required that Goldman reassess and reshape its corporate 
ethos.64 
Because neither civil case went to trial, it is impossible to know 
how defendants would have constructed legal arguments, how judges 
would have ruled on contested testimony, or how rules of evidence 
would have impacted outcomes.  What is clear, however, is that both 
BMIS and Goldman Sachs suffered from failures of leadership that led to 
the firms having to disgorge ill-gotten gains and pay penalties.  Madoff’s 
guilt in perpetrating the Ponzi fraud had been established by his guilty 
plea in the earlier criminal case; in the subsequent civil case, the SEC 
was therefore not required to establish intent to prove Madoff’s 
liability.65  In the Goldman Sachs litigation, the SEC named Tourre, a 
mid-level manager, rather than a corporate officer, as co-defendant with 
the corporation.  While the firm’s record settlement reflected a tacit 
acknowledgment of minor failures in marketing materials, Goldman fell 
 59 S.E.C. v. Goldman Sachs & Co., 790 F. Supp. 2d 147 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) motion to certify 
appeal denied, 10 CIV. 3229 BSJ, 2011 WL 4940908 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 17, 2011) and motion for relief 
from judgment denied, 10 CIV. 3229 KBF, 2012 WL 5838794 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 19, 2012). 
 60 Press Release, S.E.C., Goldman Sachs to Pay Record $550 Million to Settle SEC Charges 
Related to Subprime Mortgage CDO (Jul. 15, 2010), www.sec.gov/news/press/2010/2010-123.htm 
[hereinafter Release]. 
 61 Id. 
 62 Id. 
 63 Id. 
 64 See discussion infra Part I.A. 
 65 Eugene Volokh, Comment to Criminal Liability and Civil Liability, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY 
(Sept. 4, 2008, 1:40 PM), www.volokh.com/posts/1220550026.shtml (“If you get criminally 
convicted, then this conviction will usually make a civil plaintiff’s case against you much easier. 
Under the doctrine of collateral estoppel . . . , if a fact has been decided against a party in one 
judicial proceeding, then that fact is generally binding against the same party in future 
proceedings . . . even in other jurisdictions and other court systems.”) (internal quotations omitted). 
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short of acknowledging liability for the charges of fraud reflected in the 
complaint.66 
Senator of Oklahoma Tom Coburn expressed doubt that a mid-level 
manager such as Tourre had the type or level of responsibility at 
Goldman that would enable him to perpetrate the type of fraud reflected 
in the complaint, saying “if I worked for Goldman Sachs, I’d be real 
worried that somebody has made a decision, ‘[I am] going to be a 
whipping boy, [I am] the guy that’s getting hung out to dry.’”67  Even if 
evidence unequivocally established that Tourre did operate 
independently, the results of his conduct strongly implicate shortcomings 
in corporate culture and leadership from corporate headquarters.  The 
remaining questions about control person liability,68 then, revolve around 
rationales for assigning liability to corporate officers and the methods 
that may be employed to establish that liability.69 
As the global economy was engulfed by a tsunami of toxic debt70 
and the United States legislature called on taxpayer funds to save 
financial institutions that were deemed “too big to fail,”71 stewards of 
these same institutions enjoyed the security of bloated compensation and 
severance packages,72 yet remained free of liability to the ruined 
consuming public.73 
This Comment’s argument is divided into three main parts.  Part 
One sets the scene by discussing the background of corporate criminal 
liability and briefly outlining three laws passed shortly after the Great 
 66 Hurtado, supra note 58. 
 67 Hearing, supra note 2 (statement of Tom Coburn, Senator of Oklahoma, to Blankfein); Id. 
 68 15 U.S.C.A. § 78t(a) (Westlaw 2014) (“Every person who, directly or indirectly, controls 
any person liable under any provision of this title or of any rule or regulation thereunder shall also be 
liable jointly and severally with and to the same extent as such controlled person to any person to 
whom such controlled person is liable . . . unless the controlling person acted in good faith and did 
not directly or indirectly induce the act or acts constituting the violation or cause of action.”). 
 69 See generally Darryl P. Rains, The Future of Control Person Liability After Janus, 9:2 
THOMSON REUTERS SECURITIES LITIGATION REPORT, Feb. 2012, at 10-16, available at 
www.mofo.com/files/Uploads/Images/120227-Liability-after-Janus.pdf (predicting the increased 
use, and describing the implementation, of control person liability in private securities litigation). 
 70 The ‘Toxic Debt’ Tsunami, THE WEEK (Mar. 12, 2009), 
http://theweek.com/article/index/94172/the-toxic-debt-tsunami. 
 71 “Too big to fail” is a doctrine that originated with the 1913 establishment of central 
banking, that was included in the 1950 amendment to the Federal Deposit Insurance Act of 1934 (as 
the “essentiality doctrine”), and, finally, was given its current name in 1984, when the U.S. 
government began to pursue a deliberate policy of bailing out large commercial banks that were 
deemed “too big to fail.”  See Richard M. Salsman, Banking Without the Too-Big-to-Fail Doctrine, 
Address at the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas Conference (May 12, 1992), available at 
www.fee.org/the_freeman/detail/banking-without-the-too-big-to-fail-doctrine/#axzz2NXKz6g2p. 
 72 See discussion infra Part II.A. 
 73 See discussion infra Part II.B.I. 
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Depression.  Part Two narrows the discussion of corporate liability onto 
executives by reviewing laws, enacted shortly before the Subprime 
Crises, which facilitated both increased executive compensation and 
decreased exposure to liability.  It reviews a claim filed after the 
Subprime Crisis by a private institution against the most profitable 
securities firm in Wall Street history, then explores measures taken by 
the federal legislature to try to address the causes of the crisis.  Part 
Three recommends securities industry self-regulation through a policy of 
deterrence, facilitated by changes to current law, an immensely powerful 
new regulatory agency with a highly articulated strategy of assessing 
blameworthiness, and a judicial reinterpretation of corporate civil 
liability based on existing corporate criminal liability doctrine. 
I. BACKGROUND 
Corporations have been imputed with legal personhood.74  In a 
healthy economic system, corporate decision-making can be designed 
not only to benefit shareholders, but also to contribute to the greater 
good.75  When decisions lead to criminal acts, corporations can be 
subjected to criminal liability.76  When decisions proximately cause 
economic loss, corporations can be subjected to civil liability.77  There is 
a logical fallacy in this progression, which is that corporations are not 
actual persons and, therefore, do not actually possess the capacity for 
choice.  The corporation itself is a legal construct.  In the case of a 
corporation operated by altruistic employees, corporate liability rightly 
shelters from potentially ruinous penalties those employees who make 
honest mistakes.  In the case of a corporation operated by leaders whose 
actions amount to fraud or misrepresentation or any other statutorily 
proscribed act, the corporation and any individual employees responsible 
can be subjected to criminal liability.78  Whereas corporations of the past 
enabled officers to benefit from the corporate structure, modern financial 
services corporations often develop such intricate structural complexities 
 74 Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 2011 WL 6780141 (U.S.), 25-26 (U.S. 2011) (“All 
legal systems also recognize corporate personhood . . . recognize that corporate legal responsibility 
is part and parcel of the privilege of corporate personhood.”) (citation omitted). 
 75 Paul B. Brown, Strategic Corporate Altruism, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 23, 2006, (“The essential 
test that should guide corporate social responsibility . . . is not whether a cause is worthy but whether 
it presents an opportunity to create shared value — that is, a meaningful benefit for society that is 
also valuable to the business.”) (citation omitted). 
 76 See Kiobel, 2011 WL 6780141, at 25-26. 
 77 Release, supra note 60, at 8 (Goldman $550 million civil settlement). 
 78 See discussion infra Part I.A. 
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that they end up providing shelter to executives whose actions appear to 
disparage the collective good, even if they cannot be proven to amount to 
fraud.79 
These most basic principles provide relevant guidance to legislators 
and business leaders.  Clearly delineated rules created by a legislature, 
driven by consumer interests, consonant with the greater good, provide 
clear signposts for businesses to follow.  Clearly delineated rules within a 
corporation can create a corporate culture, an ethos,80 whereby neither 
mistakes nor bad acts are likely to reach the consuming public, generally 
through the administration of a robust compliance department.81  The 
shorter the distance between corporate management and the investing 
public, the less likely it is that mistakes or violations will escape 
detection.  That is, the bigger the corporation and the more intricate its 
structural complexities, the more difficulties management face in 
maintaining and controlling corporate culture. 
Part One addresses the background of corporate criminal liability 
and securities law.  Both the courts82 and the legislature83 have 
recognized the important role that corporations play in the business 
world, while also providing clearly delineated rules for corporations to 
follow in order to work within the confines of the law.  Although 
corporate criminal liability is outside the scope of this article, the 
development of this area of law is relevant.  Also relevant to any 
background discussion of modern securities litigation is a review of three 
laws passed in the 1930s that created the framework for sustainable 
development of the modern financial system.84 
 79 It is hard to imagine how a highly-publicized, multi-million dollar settlement to a U.S. 
regulatory agency is good for either corporate shareholders or for the broader investing public.  See, 
e.g., S.E.C. v. Goldman Sachs. 
 80 See discussion infra Part I.A. 
 81 See, e.g., News Release, Wells Fargo Names Yvette Hollingsworth Chief Compliance 
Officer, Wells Fargo (May 14, 2012), 
https://www.wellsfargo.com/press/2012/20120514_WellsFargoNamesYvetteHollingsworth (“As 
chief compliance officer, Hollingsworth will be responsible for ensuring that all areas of the 
company meet compliance management responsibilities and abide by all applicable laws and 
regulations. Her team will continue to provide independent oversight of business-based compliance 
management activities.”). 
 82 See discussion infra Part I.A. 
 83 See discussion infra Part I.B. 
 84 See discussion infra Parts I.A-B. 
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A. CORPORATE CRIMINAL LIABILITY:DEVELOPED FROM TORT LAW’S 
VICARIOUS LIABILITY PRINCIPLE 
In 2006, the Thompson Memorandum’s85 policy, favoring federal 
prosecutors’ capacity to pressure corporations to cooperate with 
investigations against their own employees, came under criticism by 
Judge Lewis Kaplan of the Southern District Court of New York.86  
Within a year of Kaplan’s scathing critique of prosecutorial policies in 
United States v. Stein, Assistant United States Attorney Preet Bharara 
responded in writing in the American Criminal Law Review.87  Whereas 
Kaplan’s opinion had focused on alleged abuses of prosecutorial 
discretion, Bharara effectively argued that prosecutors had gained 
leverage not by abuses, but rather by 100 years of court-sanctioned 
expansion of corporate criminal liability.88 
Unchecked prosecutorial discretion has the potential to “threaten the 
functioning of entire industries and subject work forces the size of cities 
to unemployment as a collateral consequence of . . . do[ing] what the law 
permits.”89  However, the Court has never upheld checks on 
prosecutorial discretion.90  Rather, courts “repeatedly concluded that the 
scourge of corporate crime requires rules that are different, tough, and 
effective in ferreting out wrongdoing.”91  In other words, courts have 
given more latitude to prosecutorial discretion where corporate crime is 
involved. 
Corporate criminal liability developed from its origin in the 
landmark case New York Central v. United States.92  Before that, 
corporations were not indictable, but the Court in New York Central 
looked to the law of torts for guidance, settling upon the concept of 
vicarious liability as a leading principle.  “The act of the agent . . . may 
be controlled, in the interest of public policy, by imputing his act to his 
employer and imposing penalties upon the corporation for which he is 
 85 See Memorandum from Larry D. Thompson, Deputy Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to 
Heads of Dep’t Components, U.S. Dep’t of Justice (Jan. 20, 2003), available at 
www.usdoj.gov/dag/cftfbusiness_organizations.pdf. 
 86 United States v. Stein, 435 F. Supp. 2d 330 (S.D.N.Y. 2006). 
 87 Preet Bharara, Corporations Cry Uncle and their Employees Cry Foul: Rethinking 
Prosecutorial Pressure on Corporate Defendants, 44 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 53 (2007). 
 88 Id. at 54-55. 
 89 Id. at 59. 
 90 Id. 
 91 Id. at 60. 
 92 New York Cent. & H.R.R. Co. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481, 29 S. Ct. 304, 53 L. Ed. 613 
(1909). 
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acting in the premises.”93  The Court appears to have reasoned its 
holding on the premise that at least one way to prevent illegal acts from 
being committed by individuals was to give their corporate employers 
powerful incentives to self-police.94  The corporate defendant’s prescient 
argument in New York Central, that to punish a corporation was actually 
to punish its innocent shareholders, was dismissed by the 95
As a consequence of the Court adopting the principle of vicarious 
liability, a doctrine known as “collective knowledge” emerged in United 
States v. Bank of New England.96  Under the collective knowledge 
doctrine, the aggregate knowledge of a corporation’s employees, 
knowledge used to further the purpose of the corporation, is attributable 
to the corporation itself for purposes of criminal liability.97  The potency 
of the collective knowledge doctrine derives from the fact that it exposes 
a corporation to criminal liability even if no individual actor can be 
identified for the purpose of proving intent.98 
The broader impacts of New York Central and Bank of New 
England are three-fold.  First, corporations can be held criminally liable 
even if criminal conduct is undertaken without the knowledge of top 
management.  Second, corporations can be held criminally liable even if 
the agent responsible for the crime cannot be identified.  Third, 
corporations can be held criminally liable even if the offending 
employees are all acquitted of the same offense.99  Therefore, if a law-
breaking employee can act discreetly enough to avoid detection by a 
corporate compliance program, and prosecution under the law, and yet 
the corporation is still criminally liable for the employee’s misconduct, 
then the legal pendulum has swung too far away from its primary 
purpose of providing justice.  While “it is a logical paradox that this 
creature of the law—the corporate entity—is created by the law with the 
power to violate the law,”100 it is an even greater logical paradox that this 
creature of the corporation—the management executive—is created by 
the corporation with the power to destroy it. 
 93 Bharara, supra note 87, at 61. 
 94 Id. at 81. 
 95 Id. at 61. 
 96 United States v. Bank of New England, 821 F.2d 844, 855 (1987) (“[I]ts knowledge is the 
sum of the knowledge of all of the employees . . .[t]hat is, the bank’s knowledge is the totality of 
what all of the employees know within the scope of their employment.”). 
 97 Bharara, supra note 87, at 64-65. 
 98 Id. at 63-64. 
 99 Id. at 64-65. 
 100 Standard Oil Co. of Tex. v. United States, 307 F.2d 120, 127 (5th Cir. 1962). 
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In his article, Bharara recognized the need for tightening rules for 
corporate criminal liability.101  He offered three approaches, one of 
which is relevant to this discussion.  Bharara attributed his coverage of 
the corporate culture approach to “an influential article” wherein the 
author “overcomes difficulties of attributing mens rea and assigning 
blame to . . . an artificial entity by developing a corporate ‘ethos’ 
theory . . . by which prosecutors . . . and the public can identify the 
blameworthiness of the corporation.”102  According to this approach, the 
values that Bharara focused on, namely the difficulties of finding intent 
and the need to identify blameworthiness, are both met if a corporate 
“ethos” can be identified.  If “ethos” is defined as “the set of beliefs or 
ideas about the behavior and relationships of a person or group” and 
“most companies have a corporate ethos,”103 and if executives comprise 
the command and control components of a corporation, then a corporate 
ethos should always be attributable to its executives.  It follows that if a 
corporation is found to be criminally liable for fraud, its command and 
control executives should always be civilly liable, even if they are not 
considered to possess the requisite specific intent to be found guilty 
under criminal law.  Executives that are criminally liable should be 
civilly liable because they set the corporate ethos that propagated the 
violatio
Just as corporate criminal liability doctrine developed with a keen 
eye to the relationship between the corporation and the corporate 
employee, so too should contemporary corporate civil liability doctrine 
develop.  Proscribed acts transgressed by individual employees can 
rightly subject corporations to criminal sanctions (because of 
blameworthiness and the need for justice in criminal issues), and the 
collective knowledge doctrine thereby takes center stage.  Similarly, acts 
that cause financial crises, but without apparent intent on the part of any 
individual, should also be attributable to the corporation, but, as in Hertz, 
that attribution should be directed at the principal place of business.  The 
corporate ethos, after all, is what determines the direction of the 
 101 Bharara, supra note 87, at 107. 
 102 Id. at 107-108; see Pamela H. Bucy, Corporate Ethos: A Standard for Imposing Corporate 
Criminal Liability, 75 MINN. L. REV. 1095, 1099 (1991) (“[T]he standard proposed herein imposes 
criminal liability on a corporation only if the corporation encouraged the criminal conduct at issue.  
If it did, the criminal conduct is not an accident or the unpredictable act of a maverick employee.  
Instead, the criminal conduct is predictable and consistent with corporate goals, policies, and ethos.  
In the context of a fictional entity, this translates into intention.”). 
 103 Ethos Definition, CAMBRIDGE BUSINESS ENGLISH DICTIONARY, 
http://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/business-english/ethos?q=ethos (last visited Mar. 22, 
2013). 
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corporation.  The corporate officers who have overseen Goldman Sachs’ 
emergence as the most profitable securities firm in Wall Street history 
are the same corporate officers whose alleged malfeasance resulted in the 
largest settlement ever paid in an SEC action.  These officers take 
compensation for the first result, but are not held liable for the second 
result. 
B. POST-STOCK MARKET CRASH LEGISLATION: BANKING, 
SECURITIES, AND EXCHANGE ACTS 
Modern securities law can be traced to the government’s response to 
the Stock Market Crash of 1929 (Crash).  In the wake of the massive 
speculation and frauds that precipitated the Crash,104 the federal 
legislature addressed public concern about future financial industry 
problems by enacting three laws, the Banking Act of 1933 (Banking 
Act),105 the Securities Act of 1933 (Securities Act),106 and the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act).107 
Taken separately, each of these laws reflects the awareness by 
government of independent causative factors for the Crash.  The Banking 
Act was aimed at providing solutions to a problematic banking industry 
structure, designed to address the problem of speculation108 and to 
restore faith in commercial banking by establishing the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation (FDIC).109  The Securities Act and Exchange Act 
were more related to regulating behaviors.  The goal of the Securities Act 
was “to provide full and fair disclosure of the character of securities sold 
in interstate and foreign commerce and through the mails, and to prevent 
frauds in the sale thereof, and for other purposes.”110  To accomplish this 
goal, the Act required issuers of securities to make full material 
disclosures about their products and to register them with the SEC.111  
The purpose of the Exchange Act was to regulate the secondary trading 
 104 Deepa Sarkar, Securities Law History, CORNELL UNIVERSITY LAW SCHOOL LEGAL 
INFORMATION INSTITUTE, www.law.cornell.edu/wex/securities_law_history (last visited Mar. 14, 
2013). 
 105 Banking Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-66, 48 Stat. 162 (Westlaw 2014). 
 106 Securities Act of 1933, 48 Stat. 74 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77a) (Westlaw 2014). 
 107 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 881 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78a) (Westlaw 
2014). 
 108 See Edwin J. Perkins, The Divorce of Commercial and Investment Banking: A History, 
88:6 BANKING LAW JOURNAL 483–528 (1971). 
 109 See Carter Golembe, The Deposit Insurance Legislation of 1933: An Examination of its 
Antecedents and its Purposes, 75:2 POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY 181 (Jun., 1960). 
 110 § 77a. 
 111 Id. 
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of securities by brokers or dealers.112  The Act established the SEC, 
which became the “primary overseer and regulator of the U.S. securities 
markets.”113 
While each of these laws established separate guidelines, when 
taken together, they represent clearly defined policy-making.  In 
aggregate, these three laws were enacted in order to ensure that the 
investing public would never again be subjected to the types of 
speculative investing, fraud, or misrepresentation that created the 1929 
Crash.  In light of the extraordinary complexity of financial products and 
corporate structures, both of which contributed to the Subprime Crisis, 
one must consider whether each of these laws is still effective, or 
whether they require slight or significant modification.  One must also 
question whether speculative investing, fraud, or misrepresentation are 
still the benchmarks of liability or, rather, if concepts of liability ought to 
be simplified.114  Although these questions are technically outside the 
scope of this Comment, this legislation is still highly relevant to the 
discussion to come. 
1. Banking Act of 1933 
The Banking Act has been commonly referred to by another name, 
the Glass-Steagall Act (Glass Steagall).115  The Glass-Steagall provisions 
within the Banking Act,116 those which required separation of 
commercial and investment banking activities, were repealed in 1999 by 
the passage of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA).117  Critics of the 
GLBA attribute responsibility for the Subprime Crisis to the fact that 
commercial banks in 1999 were suddenly deregulated, liberated to use 
 112 § 78a. 
 113 SEC, THE INVESTOR’S ADVOCATE: HOW THE SEC PROTECTS INVESTORS, MAINTAINS 
MARKET INTEGRITY, AND FACILITATES CAPITAL FORMATION (2013) [hereinafter Investor’s 
Advocate]. 
 114 See e.g., James B. Stewart, Volcker Rule, Once Simple, Now Boggles, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 22, 
2011, at B1 (statement of Paul Volcker) (“I’d write a much simpler bill. I’d love to see a four-page 
bill that bans proprietary trading and makes the board and chief executive responsible for 
compliance. And I’d have strong regulators. If the banks didn’t comply with the spirit of the bill, 
they’d go after them.”). 
 115 Glass-Steagall refers to the two proponents of the bills that were eventually combined an 
enacted as the Banking Act of 1933, specifically Virginia Senator Carter Glass and Alabama 
Representative Henry B. Steagall.  See The Long Demise of Glass-Steagall, PBS FRONTLINE (May 8, 
2003), www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/wallstreet/weill/demise.html. 
 116 See Arthur E. Wilmarth, The Expansion of State Bank Powers, the Federal Response, and 
the Case for Preserving the Dual Banking System, 58 FORDHAM L. REV. 1133, 1161 (1990). 
 117 Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 
6801) (Westlaw 2014) (also known as the Financial Services Modernization Act of 1999). 
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investor deposits to underwrite complex and risky products, thereby 
exposing the entire deposit banking system to the type of risk previously 
reserved for sophisticated investors through investment banks.118  While 
this view is attractive for its simplicity, it is also worth noting two other 
points: first, by 1935, Senator Glass himself had become dissatisfied with 
these same provisions119 and second, present-day supporters of the 
GLBA such as Bill Clinton argue that it actually softened the impact of 
the Subprime Crisis.120 
The legislative history of the Banking Act reveals the driving 
factors behind its passage through both houses of Congress, while the 
heavy involvement of President Franklin Roosevelt in the final drafting 
process underscores the view that its passage was considered vital to the 
health of the nation’s economy.121  While Senator Glass initially 
advocated the separation of commercial banking activities from 
investment banking activities, he also sought to create a unified banking 
system, whereby all banking institutions, whether large national banks 
with branches in several states, or state chartered unit banks with only 
one location, would be subject to the same measures of regulation under 
the Federal Reserve System.122This unified banking system approach 
was Senator Glass’ response to a rush of unit bank closures that 
threatened the banking industry during the early 1930s.123  The bill 
passed Congress with minor changes to these two provisions by an 
 118 See generally Damian Paletta & Kara Scannell, Ten Questions for Those Fixing the 
Financial Mess, THE WALL STREET JOURNAL (Mar. 10, 2009), 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123665023774979341.html (stating President Barack Obama blamed 
the GLBA’s deregulation for the financial crisis); see also Marcus Baram, Who’s Whining Now?  
Gramm Slammed by Economists, ABC NEWS (Sept. 19, 2008), 
http://abcnews.go.com/print?id=5835269. 
 119 Arthur E. Wilmarth, Did Universal Banks Play a Significant Role in the U.S. Economy’s 
Boom-and-Bust Cycle of 1921-33? A Preliminary Assessment, GWU LEGAL STUDIES RESEARCH 
PAPER NO. 171, 4 CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS IN MONETARY AND FINANCIAL LAW 559, 590 (2005), 
available at http://sgfsrn.com/abstract=8382674. 
 120 See Maria Bartiromo, Bill Clinton on the Banking Crisis, McCain, and Hillary, 
BUSINESSWEEK, Sept. 23, 2008, available atwww.businessweek.com/stories/2008-09-23/bill-
clinton-on-the-banking-crisis-mccain-and-hillary. 
 121 See Lyndon H. LaRouche, How FDR Reversed the 1933 Banking Crisis, 34:9 EXECUTIVE 
INTELLIGENCE REVIEW 40, 41 (Mar. 2, 2007), available 
atwww.larouchepub.com/eiw/public/2007/eirv34n09-20070302/eirv34n09-20070302.pdf (statement 
of Franklin Roosevelt) (“[W]e were busy drafting this legislation in conference with the 
Congressional leaders, and also devoting ourselves to devising arrangements to permit the banks to 
meet certain essential payments during the banking holiday.”). 
 122 See SUSAN ESTABROOK KENNEDY, THE BANKING CRISIS OF 1933 205-207 (Univ. Press of 
Ky. 1st ed. 1973) [hereinafter Kennedy]; see also HELEN BURNS, THE AMERICAN BANKING 
COMMUNITY AND NEW DEAL BANKING REFORMS, 1933-1935 71-72 (Greenwood Press 1974). 
 123 See KENNEDY, supra note 122, at 207. 
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 the Banking 
Act.
 July 30, 1999, the bill passed the House by a 
marg
increased competition or rather, as some have suggested, a bill strong-
 
overwhelming 54-9 vote on January 25, 1933.124  In the House of 
Representatives, Representative Steagall had been fighting to protect unit 
banks by establishing federal deposit insurance, which would allow 
smaller banks to compete for deposits with larger banks,125 and to 
preserve the “dual banking system.”126  The House passed the bill by an 
overwhelming 262-19 vote on May 23, 1933, and on June 16, 1933, 
President Roosevelt signed H.R. 5661 into law, establishing
127 
In 1999, nearing the end of the Clinton presidency, a period 
characterized at least in part by its economic stability and growth,128 the 
GLBA repealed the provisions of the Banking Act that had separated 
commercial and investment banking activities.  The stated goal of the 
GLBA, as indicated by its full title, was “to enhance competition in the 
financial services industry by providing a prudential framework for the 
affiliation of banks, securities firms, and other financial service 
providers.”129  The bill passed the Senate on May 6, 1999 by a slim 
margin of 54-44.  On
in of 241-132.130 
Neither the Banking Act nor the GLBA is cited in the case law 
discussed below, as neither was enacted to provide guidelines for 
behavior, but rather to define the structures within which financial 
institutions must operate.  However, the Banking Act and GLBA could 
inform the aspirations of current government leadership.  The Banking 
Act enjoyed overwhelming support during its run through both houses of 
Congress, due to the urgent need to restore faith in the United States 
banking system.  The GLBA was proposed and passed by a slim margin 
during a period of economic prosperity.  Whether it was a vehicle for 
 124 12 U.S.C. § 227; see also KENNEDY, supra note 122, at 73. 
 125 See Eugene White, World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 1541: Deposit Insurance, 
WORLD BANK, www-
wds.worldbank.org/servlet/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/1995/11/01/000009265_3961019154935/
Rendered/PDF/multi_page.pdf (last visited Feb. 8, 2013). 
 126 Christine E. Blair and Rose M. Kushmeider, Challenges to the Dual Banking System: The 
Funding of Bank Supervision, FDIC, 
www.fdic.gov/bank/analytical/banking/2006mar/article1/article1.pdf (last visited Feb. 8, 2013). 
 127 12 U.S.C. § 227. 
 128 See David Greenberg, Memo to Obama Fans: Clinton’s Presidency was not a Failure, 
SLATE (Feb. 12, 2008, 3:34 PM), 
www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/history_lesson/2008/02/memo_to_obama_fans.single.ht
ml, discussing the economic strength created during the Clinton Presidency. 
 129 15 U.S.C. § 6801. 
 130 Id. 
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armed into Congress by special interests, is debatable.131  What is clear, 
however, is that the economic climate dominated by a handful of wealthy 
corporations in 2014 is more akin to the early 1930s than the late 
1990s,132 and as such, Congress should continue pushing for reform.  No 
good crisis should go to waste.133 
2. Securities Act of 1933 
The Securities Act required that any offer or sale of securities using 
the “means and instrumentalities of interstate commerce” be registered 
with the SEC.134  Thus, given the broad interpretation of “means and 
instrumentalities of interstate commerce,” the Securities Act applied to 
the offer or sale of most securities traded in the United States.135 
The adoption of the Securities Act replaced the so-called “blue sky 
laws.”136  Whereas blue sky laws had conditioned the issuance of 
securities on their merits,137 the Securities Act rested on the idea that 
disclosure of material information about a security from its issuer to its 
consumer was a preferable means for registering securities offerings.138 
The main objective of the Securities Act was to ensure that buyers 
of securities received complete and accurate information before 
investing.139  Issuers of bad investments would not be liable for damages, 
as long as they provided full disclosure about the securities before 
offering them for sale.  Thus, “investors who purchase[d] securities and 
suffer[ed] losses ha[d] important recovery rights if they c[ould] prove 
that there was incomplete or inaccurate disclosure of important 
information.”140  By requiring issuers to create highly detailed 
registration statements about the securities and the companies offering 
 131 Financial Services Modernization Act: Hearings Before the Committee on Banking and 
Financial Services, 106th Cong. 1 (1999) (statement of Consumer Program Director Miervinski). 
 132 See Imbs, supra note 3. 
 133 “A crisis is a terrible thing to waste” is attributed to Paul Romer, a Stanford economist, in 
his comments at a November, 2004 meeting of venture capitalists.  Jack Rosenthal, A Terrible Thing 
to Waste, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 2, 2009, at MM12, available at 
www.nytimes.com/2009/08/02/magazine/02FOB-onlanguage-t/html. 
 134 § 77a. 
 135 § 77a. 
 136 Richard I. Alvarez and Mark J. Astarita, Introduction to the Blue Sky Laws, SEC LAW, 
www.seclaw.com/bluesky.htm (last visited Mar. 21, 2013). 
 137 Id. 
 138 § 77a. 
 139 Id. 
 140 SEC, THE LAWS THAT GOVERN THE SECURITIES INDUSTRY: SECURITIES ACT OF 1933 
(2013). 
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them,141 the SEC intended to “enable[] investors, not the government, to 
make informed judgments about whether to purchase a company’s 
securities.”142  The intended result necessarily relies upon full disclosure 
by the issuing company, without which a sustained high level of investor 
confidence in the financial services market would be impossible. 
The Securities Act contain provisions for litigation that can lead to 
civil liability for the issuer and underwriters under sections 11 (material 
misrepresentations and omissions in registration statements), 12(a)(2) 
(misrepresentation in published materials), and 17(a)(1) (anti-fraud 
provisions).143 
3. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 
The Exchange Act established the SEC, the agency whose current 
mission “is to protect investors, maintain fair, orderly, and efficient 
markets, and facilitate capital formation.”144  The Exchange Act, and its 
related statutes and regulations, form the framework within which the 
investing public, through the SEC, can hold corporations and their 
officers accountable.145  The Exchange Act provides the right of an 
individual private citizen to sue an issuer of stock through section 10(b) 
(anti-fraud provisions)146 of the Exchange Act and corresponding SEC 
Rule 10b-5 (“employment of manipulative and deceptive devices”).147  
While the Securities Act was designed to regulate primary issuers of 
securities, the Exchange Act regulates the secondary markets, which 
include financial institutions of all sorts, as well as the physical 
exchanges.148 
It has been said that novel problems demand novel solutions.  But 
sometimes this colloquialism is most forceful when turned on its head.  
Sometimes old problems require novel solutions, while other times novel 
problems demand old solutions.  Financial crisis is nothing new in the 
brief history of American Capitalism.  Regulations alone have not 
slowed the frequency, nor reduced the depth, of each successive financial 
crisis.  This Comment explores novel solutions to the familiar problem of 
 141 See id. 
 142 Id. 
 143 § 77a. 
 144 See INVESTOR’S ADVOCATE, supra note 133. 
 145 See SEC, THE LAWS THAT GOVERN THE SECURITIES INDUSTRY: SECURITIES EXCHANGE 
ACT OF 1934 (2013) for coverage of corporate reporting, proxy solicitations, and tender offers. 
 146 § 78j(b). 
 147 § 240.10b5. 
 148 Id. 
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recurring financial crises by interpreting old securities laws in new ways 
and by redefining corporate civil liability doctrine with an appreciation 
for the development of century-old corporate criminal liability doctrine. 
II. DISCUSSION 
Part Two raises the issue of greed in the context of executive 
compensation.  It argues that laws have allowed executives to behave 
with disregard for the greater good, costing U.S. taxpayers trillions of 
dollars.  This section specifically discusses two legislative acts that have 
manifestly contributed to increased executive compensation and 
decreased executive accountability, respectively.  The case of Dodona v. 
Goldman Sachs is reviewed in order to explain the current complexities 
of both the marketplace and corporations.  The Dodona discussion 
squares up the element of scienter, while also touching on the related 
issue of control person liability.  Part Two continues the discussion by 
reviewing some specific sections of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform 
and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank), and concludes the 
discussion by highlighting the promise of the newly established 
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB or Bureau). 
A. MATERIAL APPRECIATION, AKA GREED: THE CORPORATE 
EXECUTIVE 
Early during his presidency, George W. Bush began pushing for 
initiatives that would make it easier for every United States citizen to 
enjoy the benefits of homeownership.149  In addition to loosening credit 
and documentation requirements for borrowers, another, unexpected 
result was the psychological impact that the idea of homeownership had 
upon the consuming public.150 
In the early 2000s, homeownership was made virtually inevitable 
for anybody who had a pen and was ready to sign a document.  Because 
status could increase by way of homeownership, and because attaining 
ownership of a home was made so easy, those who didn’t have a home 
were stigmatized; their understandable response was to attempt to join 
 149 See Jo Becker, Sheryl Gay Stolberg, & Stephen Labaton, Bush Drive for Home Ownership 
Fueled Housing Bubble, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 21, 2008, at B1. 
 150 See Nestor M. Davidson, Property and Identity: Vulnerability and Insecurity in the 
Housing Crisis, 47 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 119, 120 (2012) (“[I]f property is classically 
understood as a font of security, the stability property provides can ground people not only literally 
but also emotionally.”). 
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the home-owning populace.151  Under this atmosphere of haves and 
have-nots, the have-nots could so easily join the ranks of the haves that 
they had little moment to pause to consider the consequen
Meanwhile, executive compensation skyrocketed.  In 2007, a 
handful of executives at the largest firms in the United States took $613 
million in compensation;152 the CEO earned 400 times the income of the 
average employee at the same firm in 2009.153  Just as the apparent 
economic status of the new homeowner grew with each home purchase, 
so did the actual economic status of the executives grow with the rewards 
from selling risky new products associated with the debt on those 
houses.154 
The aspirational psychology of both groups, new and prospective 
homeowners on the one hand, and executives at financial institutions on 
the other, served to encourage a race to the top.  While the madness that 
accompanied non-stop material accumulation decreased any 
consideration of accountability on either side of the transactions,155 the 
no-accountability atmosphere was almost assured as a result of actions 
taken by Congress and the SEC. 
B. PRECIPITATING THE SUBPRIME CRISIS:THE PRIVATE SECURITIES 
LITIGATION REFORM ACT AND RULE 10B5-1 PLANS 
Between the 1930s, when the securities laws were enacted, and 
2008, when the Subprime Crisis decimated the United States economy, 
long periods of stable growth were interspersed with lesser crises.156  
Then, in 2008, the United States economy suddenly teetered on the brink 
 151 See id.at 135; see also Leaf Van Boven et al., Stigmatizing Materialism: On Stereotypes 
and Impressions of Materialistic and Experiential Pursuits, 36 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 
BULL. 551, 551 (2010) (discussing research on social stigmatization of the materially deficient). 
 152 See Del Jones & Edward Iwata, Top Executives Pay Takes a Hit: Bailout Plan Seeks to 
Rein in Compensation, Exit Packages, USA TODAY, Oct. 2, 2008, at Money 4B. 
 153 See Janice K. McClendon, The Perfect Storm: How Mortgage-Backed Securities, Federal 
Deregulation, and Corporate Greed Provide a Wake-Up Call for Reforming Executive 
Compensation, 12 U. PA. BUS. L. 131, 174 (2009); see also Carl Levin, Pay Gap Between CEOs and 
Workers Now a Chasm, STATE NEWS SERVICE, June 8, 2007, 
www.levin.senate.gov/newsroom/in_the_news/article/?id=bf04517b-4fd3-4818-8575-64961bbbaf1d 
(“[T]oday, the average CEO is paid nearly 400 times as much as the average worker.”). 
 154 See infra notes 196-197. 
 155 The lack of accountability shows most glaringly in the spike in foreclosures, the result of 
both imprudent lending and borrowing.  See Mark Zdechlik, All Things Considered: Congress Takes 
Aim at Predatory Lending as Foreclosures Hit Minneapolis, Other Cities, MINNESOTA PUBLIC 
RADIO (Feb. 7, 2007), www.thecurrent.org/feature/2007/02/07/foreclosures. 
 156 See, e.g., CHARLES P. KINDLEBERGER & ROBERT ALIBER, MANIAS, PANICS, AND 
CRASHES: A HISTORY OF FINANCIAL CRISES (Wiley 5th ed. 2005). 
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of another “Great Depression.”157  Whereas some commentators have 
assigned blame for the Subprime Crisis on the GLBA of 1999,158 other 
changes to Federal law significantly altered the behaviors of investors on 
one side and executives on the other. 
The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA) was 
passed “as a response to the alleged proliferation of securities class 
action lawsuits that were perceived to be frivolous and instituted for the 
purpose of attempting to unearth fraud through the discovery process 
after filing the action or to secure a settlement.”159  The aim of the law 
was to stop frivolous lawsuits, but the effect of the law may have been to 
make it more difficult for private litigants to state claims in what would 
have otherwise been bona fide fraud cases.160 
In 2000, the SEC adopted Rule 10b5-1 to provide executives with a 
safe harbor from insider trading, as defined in Rule 10b5.161  The goal of 
the 10b5-1 plan was to enable executives to liquidate stocks while in 
possession of inside information.  Rule 10b5-1 plans were created for the 
benefit of executives, who, it was thought, might have legitimate reasons 
for liquidation, including the need to diversify holdings or contribute 
significant capital to the economy by way of large purchases.162  
However, the construct of Rule 10b5-1 was flawed, so the end result of 
the new rule did not meet its intended goal. 
1. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995: Preventing 
Private Securities Claims Since 1995 
Over a presidential veto, Congress passed the PSLRA, amending 
the Exchange Act to include unique, and heightened, pleading 
requirements for private claims alleging securities fraud.163  The Court 
has interpreted the “twin goals of the PSLRA” to be “to curb frivolous, 
 157 Lynton Weeks, Are We Teetering On The Edge Of Depression 2.0?, NPR (Oct. 16, 2008, 
3:27 PM), www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=95798378. 
 158 Bartiromo, supra note 120. 
 159 Charles Alan Wright et al., 5A Federal Practice and Procedure § 1301.1 (3d ed. 2012). 
 160 See supra note 58. 
 161 Insider trading is defined as: 
[A] manipulative and deceptive device[] [to] include, among other things, the purchase or sale of a 
security of any issuer, on the basis of material nonpublic information about that security or issuer, in 
breach of a duty of trust or confidence that is owed directly, indirectly, or derivatively, to the issuer 
of that security or the shareholders of that issuer, or to any other person who is the cource of the 
material nonpublic information.§ 240.10b5-1(a). 
 162 See Karl T. Muth, With Avarice Aforethought: Insider Trading and 10b5-1 Plans, 10 U.C. 
DAVIS BUS. L.J. 65, 66 (2009). 
 163 Wright, supra note 159. 
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lawyer-driven litigation, while preserving investors’ ability to recover on 
meritorious claims.”164  Lower courts have pointed to the harm that fraud 
claims potentially pose to businesses.165  The PSLRA appears to 
represent a strong Congressional intent to side with business. 
The PSLRA does not apply to public actions such as those initiated 
by the SEC,166 and also does not apply to violations of law under the 
Securities Act that do not require scienter as an element.167  In relevant 
part, the PSLRA reads: “(b) Requirements for securities fraud actions.- 
(2) Required state of mind.-In any private action arising under this 
chapter in which the plaintiff may recover money damages only on 
proof that the defendant acted with a particular state of mind, the 
complaint shall, with respect to each act or omission alleged to violate 
this chapter, state with particularity facts giving rise to a strong 
inference that the defendant acted with the required state of mind.”168 
It is clear why establishing control person liability has proven so 
difficult: top management is often insulated from the day-to-day 
communications169 that might inform pleading requirements in securities 
claims alleging “misleading statements and omissions.”170  The 
discussion now turns to the pleading requirement for scienter, or 
“required state of mind.” 
Courts were split on the level of particularity in the pleader in 
regard to the statute’s “strong inference” requirement.  There were three 
approaches before the Court settled on a single interpretation in Tellabs, 
Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd. in 2007.  In the Second Circuit, the 
pre-PSLRA standard remained, stating that plaintiffs could sufficiently 
plead scienter by alleging, with particularity, facts “that 1) establish that 
the defendant had a motive and opportunity to defraud, or 2) constitute 
 164 Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 309 (2007). 
 165 Robert N. Clemens Trust v. Morgan Stanley DW, Inc., 485 F.3d 840, 847 (6th Cir. 2007). 
 166 S.E.C. v. Mercury Interactive, LLC, 2010 WL 3790811, *2 n.2 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (“The 
more stringent pleading requirements of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act . . . do not 
apply to actions brought by the SEC.”), citing S.E.C. v. ICN Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 84 F. Supp. 2d 
1097, 1099 (C.D. Cal. 2000). 
 167 In re Enron Corp. Secs., Derivative & ERISA Litigation, D.C.Tex.2002, 235 F. Supp.2d 
549 (Harmon, J.) (“Where claims under Sections 11 and 12 of the Securities Act are grounded in 
negligence rather than fraud, there is no scienter requirement and it need only satisfy the liberal 
pleading requirements of Rule 8.”). 
 168 Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, Pub.L. 104-67, §101(b)(2), 109 Stat. 737 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.) (Westlaw 2014). 
 169 Wright, supra note 159. 
 170 § 101(b)(1). 
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circumstantial evidence of either reckless or conscious behavior.”171  The 
Ninth Circuit interpretation of the PSLRA was stricter than the Second 
Circuit, requiring the plaintiff to plead deliberately reckless conduct, thus 
demanding a heightened standard of recklessness.172  Finally, other 
courts advocated for various standards between the Second and the Ninth 
Circuits, but held generally that motive and opportunity “‘are not 
substitutes for . . . recklessness, [but] can be catalysts to fraud and so 
serve as external markers to the required state of mind,’ thus accepting 
that motive and opportunity might establish scienter, but only insofar as 
it establishes recklessness.”173  Meanwhile, a court in the Tenth Circuit 
held that “allegations of motive and opportunity may be important to the 
totality but are typically not sufficient in themselves to establish a ‘strong 
inference’ of scienter.”174  Thus, when it decided Tellabs in 2007, the 
Court attempted to resolve the issue of how to interpret the term “strong 
inference,” but within that issue the Court also had to deal with the 
considerations of motive, opportunity, and recklessness raised in the 
lower courts. 
In deciding Tellabs, the majority distilled the discussion into a 
consideration of whether courts ought to “consider competing inferences 
in determining whether an inference of scienter is strong.”175  On this 
issue, the majority said that courts “must take into account plausible 
opposing inferences”176 and that “to qualify as ‘strong,’ an inference of 
scienter must be more than merely plausible or reasonable—it must be 
cogent and at least as compelling as any opposing inference of non-
fraudulent intent.”177  Thus, in deciding the “strong inference” issue, the 
Court solved one problem, but opened the door to several, more difficult 
causes for concern, including: (1) because of the multiple complexities of 
facts in securities fraud case, courts have difficulties determining the 
relevant strengths of various facts;178 (2) because the PSLRA is a 
pleading statute, courts are faced with comparisons of plausibility based 
 171 Wright, supra note 159. 
 172 Siracusano v. Matrixx Initiatives, Inc., 585 F.3d 1167, 1180 (9th Cir. 2009) (“To establish 
scienter, a complaint must allege that the defendants made false or misleading statements either 
intentionally or with deliberate recklessness.”) (quotations omitted). 
 173 Wright, supra note 159 (quoting Helwig v. Vencor, 251 F.3d 540, 550 (Merritt, J.)). 
 174 City of Philadelphia v. Fleming Companies, Inc., 264 F.3d 1245 (C.A. 10th 2001). 
 175 Tellabs, 551 U.S. at 309. 
 176 Id. at 323. 
 177 Id. at 313. 
 178 See In re Ceridian Corp. Secs. Litigation, 542 F.3d 240 (8th Cir. 2008) (“When a party 
asserts, for example, that six factors collectively warrant a particular conclusion, we do not assume 
the district court failed to view the six collectively merely because it discussed them one at a time.”). 
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on competing factual inferences provided by only one side;179 (3) 
whether the cogent and at least as compelling as prongs comprise a rigid 
two-part test or whether a compelling inference implies cogency;180 and 
(4) what weight to give to confidential181 sources.182 
Application of the PSLRA remains a source of discord among the 
courts, especially in light of the Court’s post-Tellabs characterization of 
what is necessary for “strong inference” of scienter.  This is due to the 
inherent complexities of modern securities products and services as 
much as it is due to the complex structures of modern corporations.183  
Yet there exists an impetus to address and potentially amend the PSLRA 
because “[t]his level of litigation intensity against a single industry is 
unprecedented since the passage of the 1995 Reform Act.’  Nearly a third 
of all large financial institutions—representing more than half of the 
financial sector’s total market capitalization—were sued in a securities 
class action filed in 2008.”184  While much of this litigation has been 
brought under sections 11 and 12(a)(2) of the Securities Act, which 
provide causes of action for misrepresentations in registration statements, 
thus obviating the need to prove scienter, the difficulty in showing 
control person liability under the Securities Act because of the need to 
prove actual conduct means that the best avenue for litigants trying to sue 
officers remains fraud under the Exchange Act. 
2. Rule 10b5-1 Plans: Inviting Market Manipulation 
The Exchange Act holds that it is “unlawful . . . [to] use or employ, 
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security registered on a 
national securities exchange or any security not so registered, . . . any 
manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such 
 179 Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). 
 180 Compare In re Countrywide Financial Corp. Derivative Litigation, 554 F. Supp. 2d 1044 
(C.D. Cal. 2008) (applying a two-step approach by first concluding that the inference of scienter 
against each defendant was cogent and then proceeding to test whether it was more plausible than 
opposing inferences),with Higginbotham v. Baxter Int’l Inc., 495 F.3d 356 (7th Cir. 2007) 
(completely foregoing any comparison or making comparisons implicitly). 
 181 Compare Higginbotham, 495 F.3d at 356 (discounting confidential sources),and New 
Jersey Carpenters Pension & Annuity Funds v. Biogen IDEC Inc., 537 F.3d 35 (1st Cir. 2008) 
(“[T]here must be a hard look at [the allegations of confidential sources] to evaluate their worth.”). 
 182 Wright, supra note 159. 
 183 See supra pp. 369-70. 
 184 Stanford Law School Securities Class Action Clearinghouse and Cornerstone Research, 
Securities Class Action Filings 2008: A Year in Review at 1, 4 (Jan. 2009), available at 
http://securities.stanford.edu. 
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rules and regulations as the [SEC] may prescribe.”185  However, 10b5-1 
plans provide executives with a safe harbor against prosecution for 
insider trading.186  The crux of the 10b5-1 plan is that it “allows the 
actual liquidation transaction to occur while the plan participant is in 
possession of inside information, as long as the orders or instructions 
causing the trade were created as part of a plan that predates the insider’s 
acquisition of the pertinent information.”187  It therefore requires 
executives to set a predetermined schedule for the liquidation of their 
holdings.  This is designed to remove the element of control from the 
executive, such that if trades are predetermined, then the existence of 
insider information is irrelevant in the context of “manipulation” as 
mentioned in the Exchange Act.188 
The rule is flawed, however, because it fails to address the 
command and control that the privileged executive maintains over 
factors, not categorized as inside information, which can affect stock 
prices.189  For common investors who do not have access to inside 
information, the time to buy or sell is driven by personal speculation or 
solid research.  However, the theory of Rule 10b5-1 is that for an 
executive whose holdings are in a 10b5-1 plan, the time to buy or sell has 
already been determined by the scheduled liquidation of the holdings, so 
inside information that becomes available is worthless.  For the corporate 
officer who is able to exert sufficient control over the company, there are 
factors that can be influenced in order to make the price of a stock meet a 
predetermined plan, including the timing of the release of company 
information,190 creative structuring of financial information,191 and the 
manipulation of public expectations about stock price.192  Each of these 
factors can and do affect market dynamics.193 
In the wake of disproportionate executive compensation, Rule 10b5-
1 has been the subject of much heated discussion.  For instance, a simple 
and easy solution to 10b5-1 plan problems could be to require executives 
 185 § 78j(b). 
 186 See § 240.10b5-1(c). 
 187 Muth, supra note 162, at 66. 
 188 § 240.10b5-1(a). 
 189 See Muth, supra note 162, at 75-76. 
 190 Id. at 70. 
 191 Id. at 73. 
 192 Id. at 75. 
 193 “Market dynamics describes the dynamic, or changing, price signals that result from the 
continual changes in both supply and demand of any particular product or group of products. Market 
dynamics is a fundamental concept in supply, demand and pricing economic models.”  Market 
Dynamics, INVESTOPEDIA, www.investopedia.com/terms/m/market-dynamics.asp (last visited Mar. 
22, 2013). 
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to hold themselves accountable to the SEC by making their plan criteria 
known before implementing their plans.194  Increased transparency 
would make it easier for authorities to police malfeasance associated 
with those tempted to circumvent R
The PSLRA made it much more difficult for private securities 
litigants to sustain pleas and win cases.  Though Rule 10b5 had 
originally been drawn to provide executives with lawful and sensible 
ways to tie compensation to performance,195 the effect of the rule’s safe 
harbor provision was to encourage executives to abuse the power of their 
positions to possibly manipulate information, thereby increasing 
compensation by attaining predetermined performance plans.  The 
Dodona case, presented below, illustrates how manipulation of market 
dynamics allowed one firm to benefit from inside information at the 
expense of another. 
C. ASSESSING SCIENTER AND CONTROL PERSON LIABILITY:  
DODONA V. GOLDMAN SACHS 
In 2012, Dodona, an institutional investor in residential MBS196 
issued as part of two synthetic collateralized debt obligations (CDOs),197 
filed a putative class action suit against Goldman Sachs, its subsidiary 
companies, and its officers alleging securities fraud and common law 
fraud.198  The court’s reasoning provides a clear roadmap of how to 
address the element of scienter in securities law violations pursuant to 
the Exchange Act.199  It also addresses control person liability. 
For the purposes of this discussion only, the following factual 
allegations are taken as true.  By 2006, Goldman Sachs was “long” on 
 194 Muth, supra note 162, at 60. 
 195 See Wines, supra note 44 for a full discussion on Rule 10b5-1 plans. 
 196 “A type of asset-backed security that is secured by a mortgage or collection of mortgages. 
These securities must also be grouped in one of the top two ratings as determined by a[n] accredited 
credit rating agency, and usually pay periodic payments that are similar to coupon payments. 
Furthermore, the mortgage must have originated from a regulated and authorized financial 
institution.”  Mortgage-Backed Security (MBS), INVESTOPEDIA, 
www.investopedia.com/terms/m/mbs.asp (last visited Mar. 22, 2013). 
 197 “CDOs are unique in that they represent different types of debt and credit risk. In the case 
of CDOs, these different types of debt are often referred to as ‘tranches’ or ‘slices’. Each slice has a 
different maturity and risk associated with it. The higher the risk, the more the CDO pays.”  
Collateralized Debt Obligation – CDO, INVESTOPEDIA, www.investopedia.com/terms/c/cdo.asp (last 
visited Mar. 22, 2013). 
 198 Dodona v. Goldman Sachs, 847 F.Supp.2d 624 (2012). 
 199 The plaintiffs charged, and the court addressed, securities fraud under the Exchange Act, 
common law fraud, and unjust enrichment.  Those charges, as well as the other elements of 
securities fraud, are outside the scope of this article.  See Dodona, 847 F. Supp. at 636-652. 
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subprime mortgage-backed securities.200  Also, by that time, Goldman 
realized that the subprime mortgage-backed securities market was 
doomed.201  In response, Goldman embarked on a risk-reduction 
program.  In December of 2006, Goldman’s chief financial officer 
directed a reduction in Goldman’s exposure in the subprime market, 
stating in an email that “Goldman should be ‘aggressive’ in shedding 
subprime assets, and predicting that ‘there will be very good 
opportunities as the market goes [south] . . . and we want to be in a 
position to take advantage of them.’”202  By August of 2007, Goldman 
informed the SEC that it had reduced its exposure to subprime mortgage-
backed securities from $7.2 billion to $2.4 billion.203 
One strategy Goldman employed to reduce risk was to stop going 
“long” in the subprime market and start acquiring “short” positions.204  
Along the way, Goldman created the synthetic Hudson CDOs,205 which 
it took short positions on, then marketed to clients through a marketing 
book by declaring, through veiled language, that it was actually long on 
them.206  In relevant terms, “Goldman’s strategic shorting allowed it to 
profit from the loss in value in the Hudson CDOs.”207 
1. Scienter: Establishing Motive and Recklessness; More Like Res Ipsa 
Loquitur? 
Under the authority of the Exchange Act, “Dodona allege[d] 1) 
misrepresentations or omissions of material fact and 2) market 
manipulation.”208  Scienter, “a mental state embracing intent to deceive, 
 200 A “long” position indicates that the investor believes the security is a good long-term 
investment. 
 201 Dodona, 847 F.Supp. at 631. 
 202 Id. at 632. 
 203 Id. at 633. 
 204 Id. 
 205 Synthetic CDOs are essentially the opposite of CDOs.  That is, while CDOs are based on 
pools of asset-backed securities, synthetic CDOs are merely derivative of the value of CDOs and are 
based on nothing more than the idea that the value of the CDOs might go down.  Essentially, a 
synthetic CDO is a bet against CDO, used for leverage.  See Goldman’s Abacus: The Difference 
Between a CDO and a Synthetic CDO, SEEKING ALPHA (Apr. 22, 2010, 2:56 PM), 
http://seekingalpha.com/article/200264-goldman-s-abacus-the-difference-between-a-cdo-and-a-
synthetic-cdo. 
 206 Dodona, 847 F.Supp. at 634 (the Marketing Book reported that “Goldman ha[d] aligned 
incentives with the Hudson program by investing in a portion of equity and playing the ongoing role 
of Liquidation Agent.”). 
 207 Id. at 635. 
 208 Id. at 636. 
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manipulate, or defraud,”209 was a necessary element for Dodona to prove 
in both allegations.  In accordance with the PSLRA, private litigants such 
as Dodona are required to plead a “strong inference” of scienter, which 
means that plaintiffs must allege with particularity either (a) “facts to 
show that the defendant had both motive and opportunity to commit 
fraud[;]” or (b) “facts that constitute strong circumstantial evidence of 
conscious misbehavior or recklessness.”210  With regard to corporations 
and corporate officers, courts assume that opportunity to commit fraud 
exists.211  However, motives that normally incent corporate officers 
generally do not establish scienter.212  In order to prove scienter, then, on 
the part of Goldman or its officers, Dodona had to show strong 
circumstantial evidence of conscious misbehavior or recklessness.  Such 
evidence may exist where the plaintiff can show “conduct which is 
highly unreasonable and which represents an extreme departure from the 
standards of ordinary care to the extent that the danger was either known 
to the defendant or so obvious that the defendant must have been aware 
of it.”213  In terms of the Hudson CDOs, Dodona would sufficiently 
plead scienter by showing that Goldman had access to information 
contradicting the statements in its marketing book.214 
Difficulties in proving scienter in private litigation of securities law 
violations under the Exchange Act relate to the requirement that the 
plaintiff plead with particularity that a corporate officer either 1) had 
motive to defraud, or 2) bore the requisite conscious recklessness related 
to the commission of a fraud.  Not every case will have the type of 
smoking gun evidence, such as the emails from Goldman Sachs, present 
in Dodona; and even where this evidence does exist, Dodona shows that 
implicating control persons is difficult given the current pleading 
standards.  In public actions, the SEC is permitted to plead scienter to a 
lower standard than in private matters governed by the PSLRA.  There is 
strong rationale for extending these lower standards to private actions. 
 209 Tellabs, 551 U.S. at 319. 
 210 Dodona, 847 F.Supp. at 638 (quoting Kalnit v. Eichler, 264 F.3d 131, 138 (2d Cir. 2001)). 
 211 Id. 
 212 Id. 
 213 Kalnit, 264 F.3d at 142. 
 214 Id. (quoting Novak v. Kasaks, 216 F.3d 300, 308 (6th Cir. 1999)). 
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2. Control Person Liability: Culpable Participation via the Corporate 
Ethos 
Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act imposes derivative liability on 
controlling persons for the actions of controlled persons, “unless the 
controlling person acted in good faith and did not directly or indirectly 
induce the act or acts constituting the violation or cause of action.”215  A 
plaintiff must “show that the controlling person was in some meaningful 
sense [a] culpable participant[ ] in the fraud perpetrated.”216 
Difficulties associated with claiming derivative control person 
liability in the context of private claims of securities law violations not 
only suffer under the higher PSLRA-dictated standards of pleading, but 
also under the near impossibility of proving that a corporate officer 
maintained direct and timely control over, or was a culpable participant 
in, the fraud perpetrated.  In the case of Goldman’s chief financial officer 
who sent the email stating that “Goldman should be aggressive in 
shedding subprime assets, and predicting that there w[ould] be very good 
opportunities as the market [went south],”217 no rational person could fail 
to understand the subtext of the message; that Goldman’s costly holdings 
should be dumped on unassuming investors and that Goldman would 
make a lot of money in the process.  But while the rational person is the 
standard by which courts almost universally discern rightful conduct, in 
the case of establishing control person liability, the subtext of the email 
is meaningless.  Without being able to plead with particularity, and then 
attempt to prove, the specific actions that sprang from that email, the 
private securities litigant will fail to ascribe liability to the author of that 
email under current securities law. 
Dodona provides a glimpse into the complexities of post-Subprime 
Crisis securities fraud litigation.  Claims filed against Goldman Sachs 
benefit from the fairly widely-held understanding of the factual 
allegations described above.218  The example of the Hudson CDOs 
outlined for this discussion is just one of several similar schemes 
employed by Goldman Sachs between 2006 and 2007 during its “risk-
 215 15 U.S.C. § 78t. 
 216 § 78t. 
 217 Dodona, 847 F. Supp. at 632. 
 218 Goldman Sachs has been sued several times on several different mortgage-related 
securities claims relating to CDOs, including ABACUS 2007 AC-1, Hudson Mezzanine Funding 
2006-1, The Anderson Mezzanine 
Funding 2007-1, and Timberwolf I.  See, e.g., Richman v. Goldman Sachs Group, Inc., 868 F. Supp. 
2d 261 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). 
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reduction” period.219  The high-profile nature of the firm and its well-
documented alleged violations of securities laws raise the issue why its 
top management has not been the subject of more serious litigation 
efforts by private parties. 
One explanation is offered above: because of corporate structural 
complexities that, by design, protect the interests of corporate officers 
even to the detriment of shareholders and clients, there is no way to tie 
control persons as culpable participants to malfeasance conducted by 
subservient employees.  However, in a civil society, where justice is the 
end of the government, the solution to the problem of such unjust results 
must be a novel response by government itself.  Hertz has provided 
courts with guidance as to where to find command and control, and the 
doctrine of corporate criminal liability reflects an understanding that 
every corporation has its own ethos.  The next logical step for Congress 
and the judiciary to take is to impute corporate officers, those with whom 
the architecture of corporate ethos lies, with ultimate liability for 
decisions the corporation makes at the expense of the common good. 
D. LEGISLATORS: DODD-FRANK WALL STREET REFORM AND
CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT 
Legislators have begun to take aim at solutions.  The Dodd-Frank 
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank) is the 
most comprehensive set of financial regulations since the Banking Act of 
1933.220  The lofty goals and massive scope of Dodd-Frank inform its 
full title: “to promote the financial stability of the United States by 
improving accountability and transparency in the financial system, to end 
‘too big to fail’, to protect the American taxpayer by ending bailouts, 
[and] to protect consumers from abusive financial practices.”221  Dodd-
Frank, simply put, affects every aspect of the financial services industry 
by overhauling the American financial regulatory environment.  Most 
aspects of Dodd-Frank are beyond the scope of this Comment, but 
several sections are relevant to the recommendations below. 
 219 Id. 
 220 See James S. Henry & Laurence J. Kotllikoff, Financial Reform, R.I.P., FORBES (Jul. 15, 
2010, 1:20 PM), www.forbes.com/2010/07/15/dodd-frank-failure-regulation-opinions-contributors-
james-henry-laurence-kotlikoff-wall-street.html, for a discussion of the magnitude of the Dodd-
Frank legislation. 
 221 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 
929-Z, 124 Stat. 1376, 1871 (Westlaw 2014) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78o). 
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The Volcker Rule, under Title VI, is a modern-day corollary of the 
Glass-Steagall provisions of the Banking Act.222  In the simplest terms, it 
provides a partial prohibition on proprietary trading223 by separating 
banking institutions from the types of risky, complex, and ethically 
questionable incentives that allegedly drove Goldman Sachs’ conduct 
with regard to the type of trading exemplified in Dodona.  The Executive 
Compensation Clawback Full Enforcement Act of 2012 (Clawback 
Act),224 which died in committee, nonetheless represented a novel 
legislative approach that is worthy of further consideration.  Also, it is 
worth noting that the Investor Protection and Securities Reform Act of 
2010 (Investor Protection Act), under Title IX, subtitle E, specifically 
addresses accountability alongside executive compensation.225 
1. Volcker Rule: A Ban on Proprietary Trading 
The Volcker Rule bears the imprimatur of its author,226 who 
previously argued that commercial banks provide stability for the greater 
financial system and that schemes such as derivatives trading, which 
involve high-risk speculative investing, pose an impermissible level of 
systemic risk.227 
The proposed Volcker Rule would have resulted in a complete ban 
on proprietary trading, but in order to gain passage through Congress, 
allowances were granted that weakened the bill considerably, which may 
indicate that Congress has failed to grasp the implications of its 
responsibility to the people, rather than to corporate interests.  The 
 222  
See Louis Uchitelle, Glass-Steagall vs. the Volcker Rule, N.Y. TIMES ECONOMIX (Jan. 22, 2010, 
4:47 PM), http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/01/22/glass-steagall-vs-the-volcker-rule/ 
(discussing the similarities between how Glass-Steagall and the Volcker Rule are both regarded as 
fixes to major causes of the two large crises). 
 223 Proprietary Trading, FINANCIAL TIMES LEXICON, 
http://lexicon.ft.com/term?term=proprietary-trading (last visited Jun. 14, 2014) (“When a bank, 
brokerage or other financial institution trades on its own account rather than on behalf of a 
customer . . . .  In simple terms, proprietary or prop trading is where a trading desk, using the bank’s 
own capital and balance sheet, carries out trades in various instruments, often for speculative 
purposes.”). 
 224 H.R.5860, 112th Cong. (Westlaw 2014), available at 
www.doddfrankupdate.com/Resource.ashx?sn=ExecutiveCompensationClawbackFullEnforcementA
c2012 [hereinafter Clawback]. 
 225 Pub. L. No. 111-203, §§ 951-957 (Westlaw 2014). 
 226 Paul Volcker is an economist and former Chairman of the United States Federal Reserve. 
See Paul Volcker Fast Facts, CNN (Jan. 30, 2013, 6:39 PM), www.cnn.com/2013/01/30/us/paul-
volcker-fast-facts. 
 227 See Paul Volcker, How to Reform Our Financial System, N.Y. TIMES, 
www.nytimes.com/2010/01/31/opinion/31volcker.html?pagewanted=all (last visited Feb. 8, 2013). 
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Volcker Rule was aimed at precisely the type of institutional behavior 
exemplified in the discussion of Dodona.  In fact, Volcker would have 
preferred a much simpler bill, saying, “I’d love to see a four-page bill 
that bans proprietary trading and makes the board and chief executive 
responsible for compliance.  And I’d have strong regulators.  If the banks 
didn’t comply with the spirit of the bill, they’d go after them.”228 
2. Clawback Act: A Novel Legislative Approach 
In 2012, Representative Barney Frank drafted the Clawback Act, 
the stated purpose of which was “to prohibit individuals from insuring 
against possible losses from having to repay illegally-received 
compensation or from having to pay civil penalties.”229  Insurance 
brokerages in 2011 launched new products through which executives 
could protect themselves from claw-back settlements due to non-fraud-
related violations for which they were deemed personally liable.230  
When Frank introduced the bill to the House, he stated “the creation of 
insurance policies to insulate financial executives from claw-backs is one 
more effort by some in the industry to perpetuate a lack of 
accountability.”231  The Clawback Act, if adopted, would have 
essentially forced executives to pay judgments out of pocket, rather than 
being able to pay premiums to cover judgments in the events of findings 
of accountability
The specific language Frank used illustrates the broad effects he 
hoped to achieve by introducing the bill: 
(a) an officer, director, employee, or other institution-affiliated party 
of a depository institution, depository institution holding company, or 
nonbank financial company who is required by the Federal financial 
regulatory law that provides for personal liability, or any rule or order 
promulgated by a Federal financial regulatory agency thereunder, to 
repay previously earned compensation or pay a civil money penalty– 
(1) shall be personally liable for the amounts so owed; and (2) may 
not, directly or indirectly, insure or hedge against, or otherwise 
 228 See James Stewart, Volcker Rule, Once Simple, Now Boggles, N.Y. TIMES, 
www.nytimes.com/2011/10/22/business/volcker-rule-grows-from-simple-to-
complex.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 (last visited Feb. 8, 2013). 
 229 Clawback, supra note 224. 
 230 See Alexandra Alper & Ben Berkowitz, Representative Frank Offers Bill to Bar Insurance 
on Claw-Backs, REUTERS(May 30, 2012), 
http://reuters.com/assets/print?aid=USBRE84T15720120530. 
 231 Id. (quoting Rep. Frank). 
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transfer the risks associated with, personal liability for the amounts so 
owed.232 
The Clawback Act, if adopted, would have had the capacity to reach into 
every type of regulated financial institution in the United States to touch 
any employee found to have been personally liable in contravention of 
“Federal financial regulatory law that provides for personal liability, or 
any rule or order promulgated by a Federal financial regulatory agency 
thereunder.”233  The Bill specifically defined Federal financial regulatory 
law as most major banking laws, including in relevant parts “. . . (C) the 
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act . . . and 
(Q) the securities laws (as defined under section 3(a) of the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934), to the extent that such laws apply to depository 
institutions, depository institution holding companies, or nonbank 
financial companies.”234  The Clawback Act would have extended to 
personal liability resulting from all types of remunerative measure, and 
such a deterrent might have prevented the Subprime Crisis. 
That one of Congress’ higher profile representatives would actually 
draft and propose a bill such as the Clawback Act offers promise that, at 
the very least, the legislature is considering anew remedies as to 
corporate officers.  There is no guarantee that a law such as the one 
proposed would have actually impacted the behavior of corporate 
officers, but in the current economic climate, it is this type of new 
thinking that will be required to affect real change.235  It would have 
forced executives to consider the full magnitude of their actions, to fully 
embrace the possibility that they might be held personally liable for 
losses incurred in their professional duties.  However, the failure of 
Congress to pass the Clawback Act illustrates the continuing need for 
legislative action in the area of executive liability. 
3. Investor Protection Act: Accountability and Executive 
Compensation 
The Investor Protection Act forms Title VI of the Dodd-Frank Act.  
Its main purpose is to amend the powers and structure of the SEC in 
 232 Clawback, supra note 224, at §§ 2(a) & (b). 
 233 § 2(a). 
 234 § 5. 
 235 See Bill Summary & Status, 112th Congress (2011 - 2012), H.R.5860, THOMAS, 
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d112:hr5860: (last visited March 22, 2013); see alsoH.R. 
5860 (112th): Executive Compensation Clawback Full Enforcement Act, GOVTRACK, 
www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/112/hr5860 (last visited Feb. 8, 2013). 
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order to better delineate the acceptable relationships between consumers 
and broker-dealers or investment advisers.236  Subtitle E specifically 
addresses the need for the SEC to define issues surrounding 
accountability and executive compensation. 
Among the measures contained under subtitle E are reporting 
requirements about executive compensation,237 periodic shareholder 
voting opportunities for approval of executive compensation packages,238 
oversight of Golden Parachutes,239 accounting provisions related to the 
ratios between CEO compensation and average employee 
compensation,240 permissibility of special compensation plans involving 
hedging financial instruments,241 and rules about who may occupy seats 
on Compensation Committees.242  Subtitle E also requires covered 
companies to be ready to disclose information on all incentive-based 
compensation packages to regulators for the purposes of determining 
whether they pose significant risk of loss to the company or reflect 
excessive compensation for the employee. 
Through subtitle E, the Investor Protection Act attempts to address 
by legislation and regulation many of the concerns surrounding the 
important issue of executive compensation.  However, the provisions are 
too vague because they propose only dates for compliance by the SEC to 
fulfill its obligations, rather than hard rules, and also fail to address 
enforcement and penalties associated with violations of the provision.  
While they have not all been implemented, together the Volcker Rule, 
Clawback Act, and Investor Protection Act reflect Congressional intent 
to reduce risky behaviors on the part of executives by increasing their 
exposure to liability. 
E. REGULATORS:CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION BUREAU 
Ex post prudential regulation has proven an inadequate measure in 
effectuating behavioral change at the upper levels of management.243  In 
 236 Pub. L. No. 111-203, §§ 951-957 (Westlaw 2014). 
 237 § 953. 
 238 § 951. 
 239 § 954. 
 240 § 956. 
 241 § 955. 
 242 § 952. 
 243 See generally Elisa Kao, Moral Hazard During the Saving and Loan Crisis and the 
Financial Crisis of 2008-2009: Implications for Reform and the Regulation of Systemic Risk 
Through Disincentive Structures to Manage Firm Size and Interconnectedness, 67 N.Y.U. ANN. 
SURV. AM. L. 817 (2012) (providing a general overview of systemic risk and traditional regulatory 
practices). 
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fact, as the previous discussion of Rule 10b5-1 shows, regulations can be 
reinterpreted to provide unintended benefits to those meant to be 
regulated.  The government would best serve the interests of common 
investors by establishing a broad policy of deterrence aimed at the C-
level suites of financial institutions.  The recently established and 
independently operated CFPB244 already drafts legislation and works 
directly with consumers,245 so it is uniquely positioned to efficiently and 
substantially implement this policy of deterrence. 
The CFPB is “the most powerful agency in the history of American 
politics . . . a stand-alone agency, allow[ed] to write any regulation it 
wants, to sue anybody it wants, under broadly delegated powers without 
any oversight from anybody.”246  The Bureau’s jurisdiction largely 
preempts state agency jurisdiction, which means that covered persons in 
all 50 states are subject to the Bureau’s jurisdiction,247and most 
consumer financial products and services that relate to the capacity of 
corporate officers are currently included under the Bureau’s 
jurisdiction.248  Its authority to collect information extends to requiring 
filing of special reports “or answers to specific questions, and to make 
public such information as is in the public i 249
The CFPB’s modern internet platform gives consumers direct lines 
of communications with the agency.  These are channels that open to the 
consuming public when complaints are logged, and if enough people join 
together, the CFPB has the discretionary power to file an inquiry on their 
behalf.  Never before has the consumer had such unfettered access to the 
investigative and prosecutorial power of the federal government against 
malfeasants whose behavior has reaped so much damage.  Never has the 
consumer been so empowered to lead the discussion on what might be 
the best avenues for regulation of malfeasance within the sector. 
One thing is clear: the traditional role of government as regulator 
must evolve to more fully impact toxic influences in the financial system.  
The long-term effects of the Subprime Crisis are the subject of ongoing 
debate.  While every crisis is identifiable by its distinct causes and 
effects, each of America’s financial crises has been enabled by 
 244 H.R. 3126, 111th Cong. (Westlaw 2014). 
 245 Will Consumers and the Economy Benefit from the Consumer Financial Protection 
Bureau, Discussion from The Federalist Society’s 2011 National Lawyers Convention, 15 J. 
CONSUMER & COM. L. 86, 87 (2012) (statement of Leonard Kennedy, General Counsel, CFPB). 
 246 Id. at 3 (statement of Todd Zywicki, Professor of Law, George Mason University School 
of Law). 
 247 Id. 
 248 Id. at 106. 
 249 Id. at 208. 
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combinations of factors that include investor overconfidence, investor 
ignorance, systemic risk, and a regulatory environment purposely relaxed 
by government legislation.250  The CFPB is charged with monitoring 
consumer confidence and given the responsibility of looking ahead for 
risky products and services.251  Through its close connection to the 
consuming public,252 its budgetary independence,253 and its mandate to 
create new powers for itself,254 the CFPB is uniquely positioned to 
implement the recommendations discussed below. 
III. RECOMMENDATIONS 
Part Three advocates securities industry self-regulation through a 
policy of deterrence, to be facilitated through novel interpretations of the 
doctrine of corporate civil liability and the legal concepts of scienter and 
control person liability.  A policy of deterrence would address the root 
cause of financial crises: the ease with which executives, insulated from 
both the consuming public and legal consequences, can operate with 
impunity within the confines of highly complex corporate structures.  
Just as “an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure,”255 so too is a 
new policy of deterrence the most productive means by which the 
government of the people can protect itself against the next conflagration 
of corporate financial malfeasance. 
Specifically, this part advances in three subparts.  First, it advocates 
that Congress reform the PSLRA to state a lower standard for pleading 
scienter in civil cases of securities fraud.  Second, it argues that the 
CFPB is the regulatory agency best suited to represent the interests of 
consumers in the financial services industry, and it advocates for the 
CFPB to establish consumer-friendly access to courts, such that private 
litigants will feel more empowered to use the court system to find 
remedies.  Within the context of the CFPB, this Comment argues that 
consumers should specifically focus on corporate officers by pursuing 
control person liability.  Class-action lawsuits against individual 
executive defendants would enable common investors, for whom 
individual litigation would involve prohibitive costs, to join as classes to 
 250 See Kao, supra note 243, at 821-828. 
 251 H.R. 3126. 
 252 Id. 
 253 Id. 
 254 Id. 
 255 “An ounce of protection is worth a pound of cure” is attributed to Benjamin Franklin in his 
capacity as founder of the Philadelphia Union Fire Company in 1736.  PHILADELPHIA FIRE 
DEPARTMENT, EMS HISTORY (2013). 
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gain remuneration from executives whose compensation was directly 
related to broad economic losses.  Third, this section encourages 
Congress to draft another Clawback Bill and then quickly to enact it. 
A. AMEND THE PRIVATE SECURITIES LITIGATION REFORM ACT: STATE 
A LOWER STANDARD FOR PLEADING SCIENTER 
Legislators should amend the PSLRA in order to ease pleading 
standards for private investors so as to better facilitate their ability to 
pursue remedies.  Specifically, Congress should amend the clause—
”state with particularity facts giving rise to a strong inference that the 
defendant acted with the required state of mind”256—by eliminating the 
words with particularity and strong. 
The functional result of this change would be to shift the burden of 
proof from plaintiff to defendant.  This would force defendants to 
disclose facts, thereby relieving courts of having to interpret the relevant 
strength of various facts provided by plaintiffs who do not have the 
benefit of a thorough fact finding investigation at the pleading stage.  
Although the goal of the PSLRA in 1995 was to reduce frivolous 
lawsuits, the current too large for trial climate justifies a reevaluation of 
how class-action suits can best serve the consumers who have suffered 
the largest share of economic loss. 
The PSLRA worked well in achieving one of its twin goals, 
protecting business, but made it nearly impossible for classes of honest 
consumers to even initiate private litigation.257  The judiciary has been 
moving slowly in favor of plaintiffs; the legislative branch should take 
notice of the direction of the courts and adjust pleading standards 
accordingly. 
B. EMPOWER COMMON INVESTORS TO PURSUE LITIGATION: DEFINING 
THE IDENTITY OF THE CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION BUREAU 
The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau should seize on its 
mandate to assert “independent authority under the Dodd-Frank Act . . . 
[over] banking organizations with assets of $10 billion, with respect to 
which the Bureau [has] exclusive rulemaking[,] examination, and 
primary enforcement [] authority under Federal consumer financial 
 256 Pub.L. 104-67. 
 257 See discussion supra Part II.B.I. 
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law.”258  Specifically, the Bureau should take the initiative to identify the 
financial institutions that caused the most damage to the system and 
focus its powers on filing class-action suits on behalf of consumers 
against those institutions’ corporate officers. 
1. Narrow Focus on the C-Level Suites 
If consumers seek to assign liability where it truly belongs, and if 
they have a real capacity to dictate the terms of investigations and 
prosecutions, then they should begin to focus on the executives whose 
decisions were the most devastating, and whose compensation are the 
most ill-gotten.  Golden parachutes allowed failed executives to escape 
failed companies without accountability.  Consumers would be well-
served to utilize the broad powers of the CFPB to ensure control person 
accountability.259 
Hertz established that command and control dictate jurisdiction.  
U.S. Attorney Preet Bharara advocated a corporate culture approach to 
assigning blameworthiness, declaring that corporate ethos can be 
identified as a surrogate in the absence of an identifiable actor within the 
artificial entity that is a corporation.  Because corporate ethos is shaped 
within command and control centers, this is where litigants should focus 
their energies. 
2. Advocate Class-Action Suits Against Individual Executives 
Through the CFPB, common investors should form classes to 
pursue remuneration from individual executives whose unjustifiable risk-
taking damaged the economy so deeply.  Private lawsuits by consumers 
often amass into class-action lawsuits against corporations, but under 
such circumstances, the settlements that are reached are either too small 
to affect the corporate identity or so large that they destroy the company.  
With every destroyed company, there is a cost in terms of shareholder 
value destruction and job losses. 
It would therefore be both rational and feasible for the CFPB to 
pursue class-action suits against individual executives.  Where a single 
litigant might fail against an executive defendant based purely on cost-
analyses basis to both parties, a class of litigants would likely not be 
 258 Summary of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Enacted 
into Law on July 21, 2010, 2010 WL 3417176 105 (Westlaw 2014). 
 259 See generally How we use complaint data, CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION BUREAU, 
www.consumerfinance.gov/complaint/data-use/ (last visited Jun. 14, 2014) (providing a general 
overview of how the CFPB responds to consumer complaints). 
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dissuaded from a claim simply because an executive might have funds to 
draw out proceedings.  Hence, class-action suits against executives 
would provide remedies without the destruction of companies and 
corporations as a matter of course.  Intensified focus on control person 
liability best serves the interests of both consumers and corporations. 
C. ADOPT THE EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION CLAWBACK FULL 
ENFORCEMENT ACT IN THE SPECIFIC CONTEXT OF CLASS-ACTION 
LAWSUIT LIABILITY 
It is time for Representative Frank’s Clawback Act to be 
resuscitated and adopted.  There is no reason that executives who are 
found liable in civil cases should be able to mitigate their personal losses 
and further spread the cost to the public by using insurance.  If top 
executives realize that private individuals can more easily plead their 
way into court, can work with the CFPB to build cases, and can come 
together in classes ready to sue for compensation earned and punitive 
damages, a fully armed Clawback Act would give them pause to look 
before they leap. 
Finally, in order to allow consumers to fully realize the benefits of 
the above proposals, the judiciary must reinterpret the relationships 
between corporations, their shareholders, and their clients.  Courts should 
embrace the realist model of corporate structure, which acknowledges 
that corporate officers control the fate of corporations without 
accountability to shareholder interests.  The judiciary should model its 
interpretation of modern corporate civil liability on historical analysis of 
corporate criminal liability, thereby establishing a workable modern 
doctrine based on the command and control interests espoused in Hertz, 
placing liability where it rightfully belongs. 
CONCLUSION 
This Comment recognizes that corporations are essential to the 
vitality of the U.S. economy.  In light of their prominent role, it is now 
more important than ever that the image of corporations be resuscitated.  
But a corporate image can only reflect the value of its officers, and when 
officers can take risks without attendant liability, they can hardly be 
blamed for doing so.  The law must acknowledge the unsustainable 
paradox of current corporate civil liability doctrine, and in accordance 
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